I stand by most of what I said in the Nebraska essay, including the statement in the first paragraph. Sine qua non is a Latin legal term meaning “without which it could not be”. In other words, without the right of exclusion, there can be no property. None of the attacks on the right to exclude the use of the Nebraska trial as a foil have convinced me that this is wrong. Does the right of exclusion cover all relevant characteristics of the heritage institution? No, but I did not dispute it. I was simply saying that it was a fundamental attribute of ownership. Is the right to exclude the purpose or final value to which the institution of property aspires a view caricatured in an article as a society of hermits? Obviously not. Giving individuals the right to exclude others from certain resources is a way of organizing the management and control of resources in society. As such, it is a means of promoting a variety of objectives, including, as I will argue, a willingness to share resources.
It also has a number of drawbacks, which means that there will inevitably be exceptions and limitations to the right of exclusion. But I also said it explicitly in the Nebraska essay. Both the general regime and the civil order of ownership distinguish between movable or “personal” property (movable property) and immovable or “immovable” property (immovable property, including movable property attached to immovable property). With respect to movable property, the rules and concepts of the two systems are very similar, not least because of the influence of continental jurisprudence on the common law tradition. However, with regard to land ownership, the conceptual differences between the two systems are significant. In the civil law tradition, despite the slightly different rules that apply to immovable or movable property, the concept of ownership itself is essentially the same, regardless of the type of property. At common law, however, the legacy of feudalism has left an undeniable mark on land ownership. In 1998, I published a short essay entitled Property and the Right to Exclusion. He appeared in an issue of the Nebraska Law Review honoring Lawrence Berger, a longtime Nebraska real estate professor. The essay has been cited quite often, but I have doubts as to whether it has been widely read.
A review of the citations in Westlaw suggests that the essay is generally identified as an argument that the right to exclude is the “sine qua non condition” of ownership, a statement that appears in the first paragraph. The typical quotator understands this to mean that the essay argues that the right to exclusion is the only relevant attribute of property, or that the right to exclusion is the social purpose to which the institution of property is dedicated—two statements that are disavowed in the essay. The author then uses this caricatured view of the exclusion thesis as a foil to develop his more nuanced or ethically satisfying view of property. However, if a status quo is imposed, the party who owns the property can enjoy it at will, continue to operate its business or use the property as it has used it. Title, interest in the property to a third party. Therefore, the status quo does not mean that all profits (i.e. profits from property) made by a person must be stopped, because the status quo is not an order of residence, there is a big difference between the status quo and the order of residence, an order of residence requires the person to start or stop an activity while the status quo maintains the status of the property, So, as it is. When a court orders the maintenance of the status quo on property, it means that two components of property that fall within the scope of the status quo are possession and title. If the status quo is ordered when a proceeding is instituted, the person holding possession and title retains that ownership and title until the proceeding is settled. Essentially, the status quo is imposed to prevent third party interests in the property that are in terms of lease, sale, mortgage, gift, will or action taken to transfer ownership under the Transfer of Ownership Act. However, as with section 52 of the transfer of ownership, where a dispute is pending against the plaintiff`s property, actions relating to the sale, purchase or transfer of ownership of the property are automatically subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, which is set out in para.