2This is a continental view of the relationship between substantive and procedural law. However, this perception is completely reversed in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, where procedure as primary and substantive law is perceived as a centuries-old accumulation of case law, the result of individual proceedings. It goes without saying that this perspective is also changing dramatically in continental Europe. Clearly, the precedents of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts and the European Court of Human Rights are the result of actual proceedings. Thus, in this context, the form essential to the development of the substance is essential. In his careful review of my book La Chouette de Minerva, M. Duarte d`Almeida polemics the question of the nature of law in its historical origins. Since neither Mr. d`Almeida and I are not legal historians, or at least Romanists, it is probably not even worth starting a polemic on this issue.
My basis is not that of legal history, but Hobbesian and practical. In any anthropological situation that requires first the restoration of order and peace, and then of the rule of law, it is obvious that the primitive system of jurisprudence must begin without any substantial, explicit and articulated basis. Samoa also has a dispute settlement service, although it is clear that the substantive rules for determining what is fair and what is not are not necessarily written or explicitly conditioned by tradition. Nevertheless, the service must work. 1996 – para. 26). L. 104-294, § 607(j)(1), paragraph (26) generally amended. Before the amendment, para. (26) as follows: “The term `State` means any State, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and the Canal Area.” (17). L. 98-473, § 507, renames former paragraph 16 to (17) and expands and revises the definition of “narcotics”, including poppy straw, cocaine and ecgonine.
Former paragraph 17 has been renamed (18). 2016 — para. 18). L. 114–198 inserted “or “opioid”” after “The term “opiate”. 22At page 152, Mr. d`Almeida is beyond his jurisdiction. When he talks about the privilege of self-incrimination, he refuses to acknowledge that the integration of force into criminal proceedings is what undermines due process in its entirety, which is my basic thesis. This thesis is ultimately simple and could be written on the back of a business card. It is obvious – and this is understood even by Mr. d`Almeida – that each trial is essentially an alternative to mutual physical retaliation and thus to the Hobbesian war of all against all. The latter is an antechamber of anarchy.
It is obvious and therefore understandable that verbal and logical dispute resolution is essentially an alternative to violent dispute resolution. It follows that any integration of violence into a judicial process (torture) undermines the legitimacy of due process – its main purpose being precisely to avoid the violent settlement of disputes. Is that clear. 10This brings us to the following question to which Mr. d`Almeida disagrees, namely what is true in a trial, especially in criminal proceedings? The question of truth is explicitly posed in The Owl of Minerva because in the discussions among the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States on the requirements of criminal procedure, a leitmotif emerges, a dilemma between the search for truth on the one hand and the protection of procedural, constitutional and human rights on the other. This dilemma is of practical importance because of the exclusionary rule, which requires the exclusion of legally relevant evidence, even if it could contribute decisively to establishing the truth in criminal proceedings. Since constitutional and procedural rights are sacrificed in the name of truth, it might be appropriate to ask what that truth really means. Here we understand the truth not only as it has been understood by the Dominicans, that is, as something that has been divinely justified by God, but as something that should logically be inevitable. However, the answer to this question cannot be found in the German and Italian legal theorists cited by M. d`Almeida, but in the Scandinavian legal realist Alf Ross, richly translated by Andrej Kristan for Revus.
“Tû-tû” is Ross`s ironic decorative epithet (epiteton ornans) for nonsense, which emanates from the formalist harmony between major and minor – assuming we believe this harmony was the truth. Assuming that truth in criminal law (substantive and procedural) is something that is a pure adaequatio intellectus et rei, then this truth, for example about the reprehensibility of a certain act, does not count much, far from sacrificing procedural, constitutional and human rights for it. This uselessness of truth in criminal law is examined in detail in my book, for it is undoubtedly essential to decide in all respects whether truth is worth sacrificing the above rights. However, the thesis that M. d`Almeida has completely neglected is that this truth is Foucaultian. The truth postulated by substantive criminal law and allegedly established by the aforementioned violation is in fact self-sufficient, a fact that Hobbes took for granted when he stated: “Civil law stops, crimes also cease.” Thus, Hobbes took for granted the fact that this truth is not “something that is objectively true,” but a manifestation of state domination. This supremacy is capable of transforming the main premise into a formalistic and logical syllogism with an appropriate degree of violence. Paragraph (39)(A)(v). Hrsg.
103–200, § 2(a)(6)(D), inserted before the semicolon at the end, “that the Attorney General has designated by regulation as exempt from the application of this Subchapter and Subchapter II, based on the finding that the mixture is formulated in such a way that it cannot readily be used in the illegal manufacture of a controlled substance and that the listed chemical(s) contained in the mixture cannot not be easily recovered.” .