This is not to say that we, as ordinary citizens, can never perform acts that could be described as “law enforcement” acts in a certain sense of the word – a meaning that cannot be reduced to concepts such as law-keeping, obedience to the law, action according to the law, etc. Considerations such as those I have just mentioned are not sufficient to clarify this point. But this is not a point I want to clarify in this document. I focus on the particular and distinctive meaning in which we say of courts (and other institutional actors) that they apply the law characteristically through their actions. We regard the courts as law enforcement agencies; And what we mean is not that the courts simply apply the law like everyone else. The pragmatic application of the law presupposes conceptually – as my definition makes clear – the inferential application of the law. But there is more to be said about the relationship between the two species. An establishment, place or promote a request or petition on or in front of a person. The act of making a request for something.
A written request for a specific amount of land at or near a specific location. Biddle v. Dougal, 5 containers. (Pa.) 151. The use or disposal of a thing. Bring them together to build a relationship or make a connection; as the application of a rule or principle to a case or fact. In. Insurance. The application, declaration or preliminary statement of a party applying for life or fire insurance. Purchase money. The disposition of funds received by a trustee in connection with a sale of real property held in trust.
Payments. the use of a payment for a specific debt; or determine to which of several claims applies a general payment made by a debtor to its creditor. Our discussion raised four main aspects of enforcement in the sense in which we discussed them – a meaning I would call inferential enforcement. First, applying the law consistently means arguing in a certain way. Second, it is about drawing a conclusion about object x – any object. Third, it bases that conclusion on the fact that a particular provision p is applicable to x with some consequence. And fourth, the conclusion is legally considered true. In “Applicability and Effectiveness of Legal Norms,” Law and Philosophy 16 (1997) 201–219, pp. 203–207, Pablo E. Navarro and José Juan Moreso distinguish between the “internal” and “external” applicability of legal norms. The first concept is intended to cover what I mentioned – in section II, with regard to the application of the right of consequence – applicability before the courts; It is a conceptual relationship between a rule of law and a particular case. (See also Pablo E.
Navarro and Jorge L. Rodríguez, Deontic Logic and Legal Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2014), 126-129.) “External” applicability, on the other hand, is a normative concept: to say that a standard N is externally applicable to a particular generic case C means in its definition that the application of N to individual cases that are instances of C is required (or at least authorized) by another standard. However, this is not grainy enough: their concept of external applicability – with its generic reference to the application of a standard they do not examine – obscures the distinction between inferential and pragmatic application of the law. It`s just the latter guy, I think, that they have in mind. Where a decision has been taken by mutual agreement of the parties, no request for resignation or modification may be made. It may not subsequently be brought before another court seised of a new plea in law relating to the same subject-matter. This is what we see in The Hollandia. Denning clearly considered that admitting the appeal was the act that the court should lawfully perform; and it took that view on the basis that there was a particular provision – article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby Rules – which applied with some consistency to the specific clause in the bill of lading. Thus, it considered that the decision of the General Court was legally justified by reference to that provision; He made the provision in order to normatively support the tribunal`s action to admit the appeal – to justify it normatively, so to speak. As citizens, some authors note, we can deal with the law in different ways – we can obey it, keep it, break it, claim it, affirm it, etc. – but not entirely by “enforcing it.” Footnote 10 This is only partially true, as we know today: because we often enforce the law as private citizens.
Let`s say you want to get married, but after recently getting divorced, you wonder if you can remarry so soon. So you read the relevant laws and you come to the conclusion that you can actually remarry. They applied – by inference – the relevant provision(s) to reach this conclusion. This is an example of what is commonly referred to as the “legal syllogism”: a deductively valid argument that combines as premises (a) a general legal explanation of the first order (the “main premise”, as it is usually called, albeit imprecisely) and (b) a statement on an aspect of the present case that instantiates the precursor to this general legal statement (the “secondary premise”); and whose conclusion, which is legally held to be true, is a statement on the same aspect of the specific case. However, I cannot start by simply going to one of the other two questions. I would say that there are two types of enforcement, each of which raises its own substantive and indirect issues. So I have to start by explaining what the two species are. I call them inferential law enforcement and pragmatic law enforcement. I address the former in section II, the latter in section III and the relationship between them in section IV.
In section V, I discuss the term “cases”; and I return to our three introductory questions in section VI. (b) the officer considers that the relevant claim – that is: (A1) or (A2) – is supported by the conclusion of the inferential application of P to object X; and (a) the representative accepts φ as an act that he or she should either (a1) perform lawfully or at least (a2) that he or she is legally entitled to perform (in the sense that he or she does not, that he or she should not lawfully perform it); “Although the word `procedure` has not been exhaustively defined in article 93, it is also a concept of great scope in its general acceptance; and designates a prescribed plan of action to assert or protect a legal claim and to incorporate the necessary procedural or substantive steps.